Labor Market Flexibility and FDI Flows: Evidence from Oil-Rich GCC and Middle Income Countries by Mina, Wasseem & Jaeck, Louis
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Labor Market Flexibility and FDI Flows:
Evidence from Oil-Rich GCC and Middle
Income Countries
Wasseem Mina and Louis Jaeck
United Arab Emirates University, United Arab Emirate University
4 March 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62652/
MPRA Paper No. 62652, posted 8 March 2015 05:34 UTC
1 
 
Labor Market Flexibility and FDI Flows: 
Evidence from Oil-Rich GCC and Middle Income Countries 
Wasseem Mina
1,2
 and Louis Jaeck
1
 
 
 
Abstract: 
In this paper we empirically examine the impact of labor market flexibility on FDI flows to oil-
rich GCC and compare it to middle income countries in 2006-2011. We account for potential 
endogeneity and nonstationarity and adopt system GMM and IV estimation methodologies. Our 
findings show that in middle income countries overall flexibility increases FDI flows under both 
system GMM and IV methodologies. In GCC countries overall LMF decreases FDI flows under 
system GMM methodology. Results also show a positive “GCC region” influence outweighing the 
negative flexibility influence. Growth potential and infrastructure development matter for both GCC 
and middle income countries.   
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1. Introduction 
The GCC countries have embarked on economic diversification, which aims at reducing reliance on 
natural resources and avoiding the natural resource curse. The natural resource curse can manifest itself in a 
number of respects: lower growth, lower quality institutions and more conflicts compared to resource-poor 
economies (Collier and Goderis 2007; Frankel 2012; Mehlum et al. 2006; Sachs and Warner 1995 and 
2001). Reliance on natural resources as a major source of income exposes the GCC economies not only to 
global business cycle and the associated volatility of world oil price in the short run but also to the 
exhaustion of these resources over the long run. 
The oil resource curse can manifest itself in the labor market. Soto and Haouas (2012) identify 
symptoms of the resource curse in the UAE in terms of low labor productivity growth, massive over-
employment, and declining productivity in the public sector. The UAE 2007-2011 growth rate of real GDP 
per person employed, as a measure of labor productivity growth, amounts to 6 percent.
3
 This rate is positive 
(though low) for Oman (2.1), Qatar (2.0) and Saudi Arabia (0.8), but negative for Bahrain (-4.5) and 
Kuwait (-0.4). 
In addition to the low and negative growth in labor productivity in most GCC countries, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE have experienced high unemployment among youth. In Saudi Arabia, the IMF (2013) projects 
the overall unemployment rate at 5.6 percent in 2013. However, the projected rate for Saudi nationals is 
more than double this rate amounting to 12 percent. In the UAE, the IMF (2011) estimates unemployment 
at 4.2 percent in 2009 with youth (20-24 years old) unemployment amounting to 23.9 percent. 
Unemployment rates in other GCC countries are comparable. In Bahrain, the unemployment rate is 
estimated at 4.2 percent at the end of February 2014. In Kuwait, the unemployment rate among Kuwaiti 
nationals was projected at 3.4 percent in 2011. In Qatar, the total unemployment rate amounted to 
approximately 0.5 percent in 2014. No statistics is available on youth unemployment in Bahrain, Kuwait, 
and Qatar to the best of our knowledge. 
Unemployment among GCC nationals is due to the highly elastic, low-wage labor supply available in 
Asian and Arab labor markets, high wage rates for nationals in highly protected jobs, and the productivity 
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differential between expatriate and national labor in favor of the former. These factors have segmented the 
GCC labor markets into two, one for nationals and another for expatriates. 
FDI can be beneficial in the creation of job opportunities and reducing the socially destabilizing youth 
unemployment problem. FDI has been beneficial in creating job opportunities and reducing the 
unemployment rate in Latin America (Vacaflores 2011), Central Europe (Radosevic et al. 2003), the Czech 
Republic (Dinga and Munich 2010), Fiji (Jayarman and Singh 2007) and Italy (Spieza 2004).
4
  
 Unsurprisingly, policymakers in the GCC countries have provided incentives starting in the early 
2000s to attract FDI flows. These include the establishment of regulatory, institutional, and legal 
frameworks to govern foreign capital inflows under a generally liberal  trade regime. In association with 
such incentives, inward FDI flows to the GCC countries grew at an average annual rate of 37.2 percent 
between 2000 and 2013 from US $ 391 million to US $ 23.9 billion. Views on whether GCC labor markets 
characteristics provide additional incentives are mixed. Cammett and Posusney (2010) advocate that, 
following the 1974 oil price boom, the enacted labor hiring and firing provisions are more flexible 
compared to those in oil-poor countries. However, labor laws specify severance pay, limit work hours, and 
guarantee vacation and sick leave. In addition, labor nationalization policies of the early 2000s may 
paradoxically be counter-productive in combating the high unemployment rate among GCC nationals.  
Labor nationalization policies aimed at improving the relative attractiveness of private sector jobs by 
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 In Latin America, Vacaflores (2011) finds that inward FDI has a positive and significant effect on the 
employment generation, mainly due to the effect on male labor force. The positive effect is particularly 
important in countries with high level of informality and low average FDI inflows. In Central Europe, FDI has 
contributed to the restructuring of Central European economies and to employment preservation and 
generation (Radosevic et al 2003). In the Czech Republic, Dinga and Munich (2010) find that FDI reduces the 
unemployment rate by 1.7 percentage points and increases the employment rate by 3.7 percentage points. In 
Fiji, Jayaraman and Singh (2007) find that FDI contributes to employment creation and economic growth. FDI 
may redistribute employment in the economy, which can also be beneficial for the GCC economies. 
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increasing job security and benefits to nationals working in the private sector.
5
 However, providing 
protective labor market institutions may reduce labor market flexibility (LMF) for the private sector, 
discourage FDI inflows, and thus stifle the reduction in unemployment among nationals. Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2005) and Delbecque et al. (2007), for example, have shown that rigid labor market institutions 
increase total labor cost in European countries to the detriment to FDI inflows. 
The extent to which FDI inflows to GCC countries are related to GCC labor market characteristics and 
policies is the motivation of this research. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been examined in the 
literature before.  To address this challenging issue, we empirically examine the influence of LMF - as a 
host economy location determinant - on FDI flows per capita to GCC countries in comparison to middle 
income countries. Using panel data on GCC and middle income countries for the period 2006-2011 and 
adopting system GMM and IV estimation methodologies, the paper finds that in middle income countries 
under both methodologies overall LMF increases FDI flows per capita while redundancy costs decrease it. 
In contrast, in GCC countries overall LMF (under system GMM methodology), and pay and productivity 
and professional management (under IV methodology) reduce FDI inflows per capita. There is a net 
positive influence of being a GCC country, however.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a description of labor nationalization policies 
in the UAE, as the second largest GCC economy experiencing high unemployment rate among national 
youth, and highlights the controversy between labor nationalization (Emiratization) policies and attracting 
FDI inflows. Section three provides a brief review of the literature on the relationship between LMF and 
FDI . Section four specifies the empirical model and the data sources. Section five discusses the empirical 
issues and estimation methodology. Section six presents and discusses the results, section seven provides 
robustness checks, while section eight concludes. 
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 The gap in employment conditions between private and public sector in favor of the latter is the main reason 
why GCC nationals prefer working in the public sector. 
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2. UAE Labor Nationalization Controversy 
This section describes the evolution of UAE labor nationalization policy over time and points to the 
associated potential conflict between reducing unemployment and promoting FDI goals.
6
 The section draws on 
Cammett and Posusney (2010), Koji (2011), and Randeree (2012). 
The history of reliance on expatriates in the UAE dates back to the discovery of oil. After the 
discovery and production of oil in the 1950s and 1960s, most companies relied on workers from neighboring 
countries due to the lack of local human resources. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the UAE followed a 
relatively laissez faire employment policy. In 2004 the UAE population reached 4.5 million, only 20 percent 
of whom were  UAE nationals (Al-Ali 2008). By 2006, slightly more than 90 percent of the 2.4 million labor 
force was expatriate workers (Schiphorst 2004; Abdelkarim and Haan 2002). Most UAE nationals are 
employed in the public sector due to its superior employment conditions in comparison to the private sector 
with higher remuneration, better job security, shorter working hours, and generous vacations.  
With heavy reliance on expatriate labor in the private sector, high unemployment among nationals, 
and a relatively young Emirati population entering the labor force since the mid 2010s, the UAE government 
has embarked on labor nationalization policy or what is known as Emiratization. The purpose of this policy is 
to increase the participation of nationals in the private sector. The federal government established in 1999 a 
specialized agency, TANMIA, the objectives of which are  to achieve full employment of nationals, reduce the 
number of expatriates in the total workforce, and develop and increase the supply of qualified and skilled 
nationals to meet the labor market needs.
7
  
To push Emiratization ahead in the private sector, the government implemented a quota policy by the late 
1990s initially targeting the banking sector. In 1999, the UAE Cabinet issued a decree requiring all banks 
operating in the country to increase recruitment of UAE nationals by 4 percent each year. By 2003, slightly 
more than one quarter of the employees of the 47 independent banks and 454 branches in operation were 
Emirati nationals, and nearly three quarters of operating banks achieved their quota targets (TANMIA 2004). 
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 We do not describe the evolution of labor nationalization policy in GCC countries for brevity. An overview 
of this policy is provided in Randeree (2012). 
7
 The private sector still faces challenges in hiring qualified Emiratis nevertheless (Forstenlechner et al. 2012). 
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A number of banks have recorded increased nationalization, achieving an average Emiratization rate of 34.4 
percent across all UAE banks by 2010.  
Besides the quota policy which encourages the demand for national workers, other measures have 
been proposed. Proposed measures have included increasing the job security of nationals in the private sector, 
the adoption of a two-day weekend system, and increasing holidays in order to increase national labor supply. 
Setting a minimum wage for Emiratis has also been proposed.
8
 However, it would distort the flexibility of the 
wage setting process and introduce rigidities in the labor market. 
Although the quota policy has had a relatively positive impact on Emiratization, it remains a 
controversial issue between the government and the private sector. The private sector complains about the 
inferior quality of national workers in terms of skills, efficiency, work ethics, and the associated high 
economic costs (Harry 2007).
9
 Accordingly, the private sector advances the reliance on expatriate workers 
instead. While the government, on the other hand, admits the need to train and develop national labor skills 
and qualifications, it asserts that the relative cost of hiring expatriate workers is too low thus rendering the 
competition between expatriates and nationals unfair. 
To reduce the gap between expatriate and national workers, a number of suggestions have been 
proposed, including the imposition of fees and taxes on expatriate workers and expatriate hiring companies. 
The Federal National Council's Emiratization committee has called on the government to subsidize the 
difference between low private sector and high government and public sector salaries to encourage hiring of 
nationals in the private sector.
10
 
                                                          
8
 http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Emiratisation_drive_at_full_throttle/53560.htm . 
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 According to the ‘Arab Human Capital Challenge’ report published by the Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum Foundation (MRMF), more than 70 percent of CEOs in the GCC countries think that local hiring 
plans will not help improve their companies’ performance. Al-Ali (2008) reports that the low fluency in 
English language and low levels of self-confidence are barriers to nationals workforce participation. 
Additionally Harry (2007) posits that “the formal or informal rights of the nationals compared to alternative 
candidates cause employers to avoid recruiting them”. 
10
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In summary, in pursuit of reducing unemployment rate of nationals and creating job opportunities for 
future generations, UAE labor market institutions have shown a movement from flexible institutions towards 
less flexible ones. National labor quotas and minimum wages, among other policies, may distort hiring 
decisions, reduce wage determination flexibility, and discourage FDI flows.
11
   
 
3. Literature Review 
Strands of the FDI  literature have empirically examined the FDI influence of quality of institutions 
(Wei 2000; Asiedu 2002; Busse and Hefeker 2007; Benassy-Quere et al. 2007; Daude and Stein 2007; Naudé 
and Krugell 2007; Mina 2007, 2009 and 2011; Mishra and Daly 2007; Du et al. 2008), intellectual property 
protection (Javorcik 2004), environmental standards (Keller and Levinson 2002; Javorcik and Wei 2004), and 
taxation (Hines 1996; Devereux and Griffith 1998). One strand has empirically examined the influence of 
labor market institutions on FDI (Culem 1988; Cheng and Kwan 2000; Delbecque et al. 2007; Mogab et al. 
2013; Lee 2003; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005; Leibrecht and Scharler 2009; Olney 2011; and Parcon 2008).  
In analyzing the impact of labor market characteristics on FDI inflows, the academic literature has 
originally focused on the impact of labor cost as part of the firm’s production cost. The conventional 
assumption is that foreign investors are rational agents seeking to minimize production costs. Studies have 
mainly used the average wage rate and unit labor cost as measures of labor cost. For instance, Culem (1988) 
analyzed bilateral flows of direct investments among six industrialized countries (the United States, Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium) and showed that unit labor cost of the host 
country is a deterrent to FDI, a result Cheng and Kwan (2000) reached in estimating the determinants of FDI 
in 29 Chinese regions.
12
 
Although wage cost is a direct component of labor cost, other indirect components are influenced by 
labor market institutions. Labor market institutions refer to the rules and regulations that govern the 
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 Interestingly, none of the education variables serving as proxies for labor quality had a significant impact on 
FDI. This finding seems counter-intuitive. However this result is explained more by South China’s preferential 
policy and geographical proximity to Hong Kong as opposed to higher education attainment.  
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functioning of labor markets, including employment protection legislation (EPL), trade union activities, and 
minimum wage legislations. EPL includes the flexibility of dismissal and notice and severance payment. 
Labor market institutions are considered flexible when labor market outcomes are the result of free market 
mechanism, without any regulation imposed by the governments or trade unions (Whyman and Baimbridge 
2006). They affect both wage and non-wage costs. Specifically, the more protective EPL, the higher the non-
wage and labor costs are. 
Many studies have analyzed the relationship between labor market institutions  characteristics and FDI 
flows, hypothesizing that rigid institutions would be detrimental to FDI inflows through their effects on 
increased non-wage cost.
13
 Using firm-level data in 14 Western and 5 Central and Eastern European 
countries,
14
 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) investigate the influence of the degree of LMF and the difference 
in LMF in host and home countries on the location of foreign subsidiaries and aggregate firm-level FDI flows, 
respectively. They find a positive relationship between LMF, whether absolute or in country difference terms, 
on the one hand and the probability of locating FDI in the host country and FDI inflows on the other. Using 
panel data on bilateral FDI stocks and employment protection indices for OECD countries, Dewit et al. (2009) 
find that for a given level of employment protection in the home country, a higher level of employment 
protection in the host country discourages home country firms from investing abroad. The absolute level of 
employment protection in the home country is also negatively correlated with outward FDI, exhibiting an 
“anchorage effect.” In addition, a strong union density has a negative impact on inward FDI. Similar to 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005), Olney (2011) examines the influence of EPL on U.S. outward investment in 
26 OECD countries, and finds that a reduction in EPL increases FDI. Delbecque et al. (2007) analyze French 
firms’ expansion strategies in 77 countries during 1992-2001 and find that stringent EPL and a generous 
unemployment benefit system in the host country negatively impact firms’ location decisions. The effect of 
EPL is modest however compared to the impact of market potential. Analyzing FDI flows from Japan to 29 
                                                          
13 According to Whyman and Baimbridge (2006) and Moran (1998), a quarter to about one-third of total labor 
costs in European countries is non-wage costs. 
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 The focus on European countries reflects the chronic labor market institutions rigidity many countries in the 
region suffer from. 
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OECD countries using annual data for the period 1989-2000, Lee (2003) finds that EPL has a negative impact 
on Japanese FDI shares in host countries.
15
 Surprisingly, his study demonstrated that countries exhibiting a 
centralized bargaining structure attract more Japanese FDI than countries with a more decentralized one. 
While the above studies find a negative relationship between rigid labor market institutions and FDI, 
other studies fail to reach a similar conclusion on the basis that rigid institutions increase labor productivity or 
are less important to foreign investor’s objective of  overcoming trade barriers. Using International Labor 
Organization labor market standards and World Bank’s labor market regulatory indicators, Parcon (2008) 
analyzes FDI flows to 195 countries during 1990-2005 and finds evidence that labor market standards exert 
negative and positive impact on FDI flows. Labor market standards increase firms’ total variable costs and 
thus decrease FDI inflows – a cost channel. On the other hand, they decrease firm’s marginal costs and 
increase productivity – a productivity channel. She also finds that some labor market standards promote 
human capital development reinforcing the productivity channel and enhance political and social stability. 
Both effects encourage FDI inflows. 
More recently,  Mogab et al. (2013) examine the effects of labor market rigidities on FDI flows using 
firm-level data for European Multinational Enterprises investment in 41 European countries during 2005-
2008. They focus on the influence of three labor market indicators: the rigidity of hours’ index, the firing 
costs, and the difficulty of hiring index. They find that the rigidity of working hours indicator is negatively 
correlated to FDI inflows for all countries taken together. However, when controlling for country 
classification, they find that the indicator of rigidity in firing  is unexpectedly positively related to FDI inflows 
in non-transition economies for three of the four years studied. Interestingly, when taking all European 
countries together, they find that increased rigidity in the labor market hiring indicator increased the 
probability of FDI inflows. These results suggest that foreign investors may have different objectives for 
investing in host countries, such as avoiding trade barriers or reducing production costs compared to the home 
country, and that flexible labor market institutions may not necessarily attract more FDI. 
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findings of these papers by showing negative relationship between employment protection and inward FDI. 
10 
 
4. Empirical Model and Data 
The empirical model adopted in this paper builds conceptually on the FDI location determinants of 
Dunning’s (1981) ownership-location-internalization (OLI) paradigm. According to the OLI paradigm, a firm 
produces abroad building on three types of advantages: ownership (O), location (L), and internalization (I). A 
firm’s ownership advantages arise from its possession of intangible assets, such as technology, patents, and 
skilled management. The firm itself does not possess location advantages but rather the host economy it 
invests in. For example, the host economy may enjoy attractive macroeconomic factors (large market size and 
potential, openness to trade and capital flows, developed financial markets and infrastructure) as well as 
microeconomic factors (cheap skilled labor, friendly business environment and labor market institutions). The 
internalization advantage emanates from the firm’s own engagement in production abroad rather than relying 
on the market, in the form of licensing or subcontracting for example, because of the higher transaction costs 
of the latter.  
Accordingly, the empirical model is expressed as:
16
 
FDIi,t= β0 + β1 FDIi,t-1 + β2 GROWTHi,t + β3 TRADEi,t + β4 FINANCEi,t +   β5 INFRASTRUCTUREi,t + β6 
INSTITUTIONSi,t + β7 LABORi,t +  εi,t   (1) 
where FDI is FDI inflows in per capita terms. FDI (aggregate) flows data are used for two purposes. First, 
aggregate flows compared to stock data would tend to be relatively closer to bilateral or sectorial FDI data, and 
therefore may better reflect the influence of labor market institutions on them. Second, flows are used to 
reduce the problem of non-stationarity associated with FDI stock data, which can result in spurious 
correlation. In addition FDI is expressed in per capita terms, and not relative to GDP, to isolate potential 
reversal causality.
17
   
GROWTH is market potential as measured by real GDP growth rate. Rapidly growing economies 
provide foreign investors with better opportunities for making profit compared to slowly growing economies 
(Chakrabarti 2001). Chakrabarti (2001) reports positive influence of growth on FDI flows in Bandera and  
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 This is similar to Mina (2014).  
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 Granger causality test shows no bi-directional causality between FDI flows and population size for middle 
income and GCC countries. 
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White (1968), Lunn (1980), Schneider and Frey (1985), Culem (1988), Billington (1999), and Choe (2003). 
GROWTH is therefore expected to have a positive influence on FDI flows.   
 TRADE is trade openness as measured by the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. 
Asiedu (2002), Janicki and Wunnava (2004), Ang (2008), Majocchi and Strange (2007), Al Nasser and Gomez 
(2009), Vijayakumar et al. (2010), and Zhang and Daly (2011) find that trade openness has a positive 
influence on FDI. TRADE is therefore expected to have positive influence on FDI flows. 
FINANCE is the degree of financial development as measured by the total value of stocks traded as a 
percentage of GDP. Ang (2008; 2009a), Al Nasser and Gomez (2009), and Agbloyor et al. (2013) find a 
positive relationship between the degree of financial development and FDI in Malaysia and Thailand. While 
not examining the effect of financial development on FDI, Alfaro et al. (2004; 2009; 2010) find that well-
developed financial markets enhance the efficiency of FDI and boost economic growth, a result that Durham 
(2004), Choong et al. (2005), Ang (2009b), Lee and Chang (2009), Wang and Wong (2009) and Choong 
(2012) also reach. Given that few studies examined the influence of financial development on FDI, we cannot 
expect a priori the coefficient sign.  
INFRASTRUCTURE is the degree of infrastructure development as measured by the number of mobile 
subscriptions per 100 people. The positive relationship between infrastructure development and FDI is found 
in Cheng and Kwan (2000), Urata and Kawai (2000), Zhang (2001), Asiedu (2002), Roberto (2004), 
Dupasquier and Osakwe (2006), Mollick et al. (2006), Majocchi and Strange (2007), Demekas et al. (2007), 
Kang and Lee (2007), Mina (2007), Ang (2008), Pantelidis and Nikolopoulos (2008), Bellak et al. (2008), 
Kinda (2010), and Jimenez (2011). We expect a positive relationship between infrastructure development and 
FDI.  
 INSTITUTIONS is the quality of domestic institutions as measured by the rule of law. In the FDI 
literature it is found that better domestic institutional functions encourage FDI (Wei 2000; Asiedu 2006; Busse 
and Hefeker 2007; Benassy-Quere et al. 2007; Daude and Stein 2007; Naudé and Krugell 2007; Mina 2007, 
2009 and 2011; Mishra and Daly 2007; Du et al. 2008). We expect a positive relationship between quality of 
domestic institutions and FDI. 
 LABOR is the degree of flexibility of labor market institutions, as measured by the labor market 
efficiency pillar indicators of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index. The Global 
12 
 
Competitiveness Index‘s labor market efficiency pillar includes indicators which reflect LMF. The labor 
market efficiency indicators include: a) cooperation in labor-employer relations, b) flexibility of wage 
determination, c) hiring and firing practices, d) redundancy costs, e) pay and productivity, and g) reliance on 
professional management. 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations refers to the nature of relation between the two whether it is 
cooperative (7) or confrontational (1). The flexibility of wage determination refers to the wage determination 
mechanism. Wages could be set at the company level (7) or through a centralized bargaining process (1). 
Hiring and firing procedures refer to whether these procedures are flexibly determined by employers (7) or 
impeded by regulations (1).  Redundancy costs estimate the cost of advance notice requirements, severance 
payments, and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, expressed in weekly wages. Pay and 
productivity refers to the extent pay is related to productivity; they would be strongly related (7) or unrelated 
(1). Reliance on professional management refers to how senior management is selected. Positions can be 
selected based on merit and qualifications (7) or kinship and friendship (1). 
Rule of law is obtained from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators.  This measure captures 
“perceptions” about “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence”. Higher values indicate better rule of law performance.  
 Data on FDI inflows are obtained from UNCTADSTAT database.  Data on market potential, trade 
openness, financial development, and the degree of infrastructure development are obtained from the World 
Bank’s WDI. Data on rule of law are obtained from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators.  
With availability of labor market efficiency pillar data only for the period 2006-2011, the number of 
observations on GCC countries is relatively limited, thus  increasing the likelihood of sampling error. We 
therefore decided to also include 46 middle income countries to expand the sample, as discussed below.
18
 The 
included middle income countries, as a group, are similar to GCC countries in terms of the percentage of FDI 
flows to GDP. Average FDI flows over the sample period amount to 4.4 percent of GDP in the sample middle 
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middle income countries is based on data series availability. In estimation 40 countries are used, however.   
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income countries compared to 4.3 percent for GCC countries. However, the inclusion of middle income 
countries individually, potentially introduces heterogeneity, which is dealt with using the system GMM 
estimator as discussed in the next section. 
Accordingly the modified empirical model is now expressed as:  
FDIi,t= β0 + β1 FDIi,t-1 + β2 GROWTHi,t + β3 TRADEi,t + β4 FINANCEi,t +   β5 INFRASTRUCTUREi,t + β6 
INSTITUTIONSi,t + β7 LABORi,t + β8 GCCi  +  β9 GCCLABORi,t + εi,t   (1A) 
where GCC and GCCLABOR are the GCC country dummy and the interaction of GCC and LABOR variables, 
respectively. 
Of the 46 middle income countries, six are from East Asia and Pacific (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam), 10 from Europe and Central Asia (Armenia, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine), 14 from Latin America and 
Caribbean (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), six from Middle East and North Africa (Egypt, Iran, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), three from South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), and seven are from Sub-
Saharan Africa (Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zambia). These 
countries are classified as middle income by the World Bank in July 2012. The six GCC countries are Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. 
 
5. Empirical Issues and Estimation Methodology 
The empirical issues we address in this paper are potential endogeneity arising from the presence of 
unobserved country specific effects and the presence of panel unit roots. Endogeneity, defined as the 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term, could result in inconsistent ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimates. Endogeneity may result from the presence of unobservable country specific effects, 
omitted variables, or reverse causality. FDI host countries may have unique features, such as strong relations 
and alliances with FDI home countries, unobservable country specific effects, which influence FDI flows. 
Multinational corporations may have also ownership advantages, such as technological know-how, input 
suppliers network, or management expertise which are not accounted for in the empirical model given the 
aggregate FDI flows data used. Reverse causality may result from the influence of FDI on growth (GROWTH), 
14 
 
trade (TRADE), financial development (FINANCE), infrastructure development (INFRASTRUCTURE), quality 
of institutions (INSTITUTIONS), and LMF (LABOR). To detect reverse causality, Granger causality test will 
be implemented. To deal with potential endogeneity, we use system GMM estimation methodology. 
To detect the second main empirical issue – the presence of panel unit roots, we use battery of 
individual unit root tests: the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS), the augmented Dickey Fuller-Fisher (ADF-Fisher), 
and Phillip-Perron (PP). We make the decision about the presence or absence of panel unit root tests based on 
the test statistics of two of three unit root tests. 
System rather than difference GMM estimation is used as the latter suffers weak instrument problem, 
affecting its asymptotic properties (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), and consequently 
both point estimates and hypothesis tests become unreliable. For system GMM, lagged differences of 
explanatory variables are used as instruments, assuming the absence of serial correlation in the error term, and 
between these instruments and the error term. We use the Arellano-Bond test to test the lack of second-order 
serial correlation and the Hansen/Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions to test for instrument validity.  
We also collapse the instruments to avoid the instrument proliferation issue and finite sample bias. 
Instrument proliferation can become an issue with the growth in time dimension. The Hansen instrument 
orthogonality test under system GMM might suffer notable size distortion, which results in poor detection of 
orthogonality violation (Che et al. 2013). Roodman (2009) suggests collapsing the instruments to overcome 
this problem and also mitigate the finite sample bias.  
   
6. Empirical Results 
To get a flavor of the labor market performance in the different regions, Table 1 provides the means of 
the selected labor market efficiency indicators for the different middle income regions. Comparing the 
performance of middle income countries among themselves,  the table shows East Asia and Pacific having the 
highest scores on cooperation in labor-employer relations, and pay and productivity, while Europe and Central 
Asia countries have the highest scores on overall flexibility, wage determination flexibility, hiring and firing 
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practices, and redundancy costs (i.e. lowest).
19
 Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest score on reliance on 
professional management. When comparing GCC countries to other regions, the GCC countries have 
outperformed them with respect to flexibility, cooperation in labor-employer relations, wage determination 
flexibility, and hiring and firing practices. 
TABLE 1 
Labor Market Efficiency Indicators (Period Average) 
Region F C WF H&F R P&P PM 
        
East Asia & Pacific 4.5 4.8 5.0 4.1 85.1 4.7 4.7 
Europe & Central Asia 4.6 4.2 5.5 4.2 25.9 4.4 4.0 
GCC 5.2 4.9 5.8 4.2 55.0 4.5 4.7 
Latin America & Caribbean 4.1 4.3 4.8 3.4 62.9 3.7 4.3 
Middle East & North Africa 4.4 4.3 5.1 3.8 60.8 4.0 3.9 
South Asia 4.2 4.4 5.0 3.7 111.3 4.1 4.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.5 4.2 4.7 3.8 81.7 3.5 4.9 
Notes: F: Flexibility. C: Cooperation in labor-employer relations. WF: Wage determination flexibility. H&F: Hiring and 
firing practices. R: Redundancy costs (weeks of salary). P&P: Pay and productivity. PM: Reliance on professional 
management. 
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between FDI inflows (as a percentage of GDP) and LMF in the 
different regions during the sample period 2006-2011. Excluding outlier observations, graphs suggest a 
positive relationship in all regions, except for GCC countries where the relationship is surprisingly negative, 
suggesting that less LMF encourage more FDI inflows to the region. 
The positive and negative relationship with overall LMF in middle income and GCC countries, 
respectively, is also confirmed with correlation coefficients (Table 2). FDI inflows (per capita) show highest 
positive and negative correlation with overall LMF and redundancy costs, respectively, in middle income 
countries. In GCC countries the (positive) correlation is highest with professional management. 
 
                                                          
19
 Wage setting in publicly listed companies in China had been reformed in the ninth five year plan of 1996–
2000 (Yueh 2004). Wages now have fixed and variable components. The fixed component includes the basic 
wage, seniority wage, insurance (medical, unemployment and pensions) and a housing fund, while the variable 
component includes bonuses, based on both individual productivity and enterprise profitability. 
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Figure 1 
Correlation between FDI Inflows and Labor Market Flexibility 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2 
 Correlation between FDI Flows per Capita and Labor Market Efficiency Indicators 
 Middle Income GCC 
F 0.349 -0.293 
C 0.084 0.027 
WF 0.207 0.298 
H&F 0.045 0.170 
R -0.462 0.294 
P&P 0.223 0.277 
PM 0.020 0.420 
Notes: F: Flexibility. C: Cooperation in labor-employer relations. WF: Wage determination 
flexibility. H&F: Hiring and firing practices. R: Redundancy costs (weeks of salary). P&P: Pay 
and productivity. PM: Reliance on professional management. Bold fonts indicate statistical 
significance at the 5 percent level. 
 
Reverse causality, between FDI on the one hand and GDP growth rate, trade openness, financial 
development, labor market efficiency and the quality of domestic institutions on the other hand, is a potential 
source of endogeneity and a concern in this paper. Granger causality tests reject the null hypothesis that FDI 
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does not Granger-cause trade openness and flexibility at the 5 percent significance level suggesting potential 
endogeneity (Table 3).  
TABLE 3 
Granger Causality between the Dependent and Explanatory Variables  
 Obs. F-
Statistic 
Prob.  Obs. F-
Statistic 
Prob.  
 Middle Income Countries Middle Income and GCC Countries 
 FDI per Capita 
GROWTH 183 2.327 0.101 207 2.066 0.129 
TRADE 178 3.870 0.023 202 0.829 0.438 
INFRASTRUCTURE 186 1.746 0.177 210 0.060 0.942 
FINANCE 165 0.135 0.874 189 0.885 0.414 
INSTITUTIONS 186 2.363 0.097 210 2.503 0.084 
LABOR       
  F 166 3.092 0.048 188 1.814 0.166 
  C 166 0.431 0.650 188 2.522 0.083 
  H&F 166 0.057 0.945 188 1.177 0.310 
  WF 166 0.074 0.929 188 0.564 0.570 
  P&P 166 0.314 0.731 188 2.901 0.058 
  PM 166 0.886 0.414 188 1.773 0.173 
  R 158 0.165 0.848 174 0.103 0.903 
Notes: “H0: The dependent variable does not Granger-cause the explanatory variable. Test is based on 2 lags. F: 
Flexibility. C: Cooperation in labor-employer relations. H&F: Hiring and firing practices. WF: Wage determination 
flexibility. P&P: Pay and productivity. PM: Reliance on professional management. R: Redundancy costs (weeks of 
salary). 
 
Table 4 presents the results of IPS, ADF-Fisher, and PP tests for individual unit roots for middle 
income countries and for both middle income and GCC countries together. The decision on the presence or 
absence of panel unit roots is based on the results of at least two tests. Test results support the presence of 
panel unit root tests for FDI; TRADE; INSTITUTIONS; and flexibility, cooperation in labor-employer 
relations, hiring and firing, redundancy costs, pay and productivity, professional management, and redundancy 
costs as LABOR indicators.  
The estimation results for middle income countries and the combined middle income and GCC 
countries are presented in tables 5 and 6, respectively. In table 5, the lagged dependent variable, GROWTH, 
INFRASTRUCTURE, and INSTITUTIONS all have positive influence on FDI flows, as expected. A one 
percentage point increase in the real growth rate increases FDI inflows per capita between about US$11.5 in 
specification 3 to about US$14.5 in specification 5. Similarly, an increase in the number of mobile 
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subscriptions per 100 people by 1, increases FDI flows per capita between US$1.2 in specification 4 to US$1.5 
in specification 1. The influence of institutional quality on FDI is of much higher magnitude compared to 
GROWTH and INFRASTRUCTURE; an improvement in the perception about the rule of law quality by 1 point 
increases FDI flows per capita between US$83 in specification 3 to US$105 in specification 5. These results 
are consistent with earlier studies mentioned in section IV. In contrast to GROWTH, INFRASTRUCTURE, and 
INSTITUTIONS, the influence of FINANCE is surprisingly negative, likely suggesting that stock market 
development boosts domestic investment at the expense of FDI.
20
 The influence of TRADE is similarly 
negative and of limited economic magnitude, but statistically insignificant. 
TABLE 4 
Panel Unit Root Tests  
 IPS ADF PP IPS ADF PP 
 Middle Income Countries Middle Income and GCC Countries 
FDI (per Capita) 0.376 0.407 0.027 0.427 0.497 0.029 
D.FDI (per Capita) 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
GROWTH 0.015 0.009 0.000 0.014 0.008 0.000 
TRADE 0.622 0.539 0.119 0.635 0.597 0.168 
D.TRADE 0.002 0.112 0.025 0.002 0.122 0.022 
INFRASTRUCTURE 0.601 0.000 0.000 0.495 0.000 0.000 
FINANCE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
INSTITUTIONS 0.753 0.607 0.032 0.671 0.511 0.025 
D.INSTITUTIONS 0.001 0.055 0.008 0.000 0.027 0.001 
LABOR       
  F 0.666 0.844 0.026 0.464 0.635 0.007 
  D.F 0.000 0.050 0.001 0.000 0.031 0.000 
  C 0.063 0.038 0.000 0.098 0.063 0.000 
  D.C    0.000 0.007 0.000 
  H&F 0.389 0.562 0.088 0.286 0.390 0.021 
  D.H&F* 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 
  WF 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
                                                          
20
 For future research, alternative measures of the degree of financial development can be used. Čihák et al. 
(2012) identify a number of financial markets depth measures. These include, in addition to the value of stocks 
traded (percentage of GDP) adopted in this paper, stock market capitalization plus outstanding domestic 
private debt securities (percentage of GDP), private debt securities (percentage of GDP), public debt securities 
(percentage of GDP), international debt securities (percentage of GDP), and stock market capitalization 
(percentage of GDP). 
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 IPS ADF PP IPS ADF PP 
  P&P 0.765 0.870 0.249 0.706 0.755 0.072 
  D.P&P 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 
  PM 0.416 0.690 0.076 0.433 0.726 0.083 
  D.PM 0.001 0.111 0.002 0.000 0.172 0.003 
  R 0.904 0.997 0.865 0.905 0.998 0.857 
  D.R* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: IPS, ADF, PP are Im, Pesaran and Shin, Augmented Dickey Fuller, and Philip Perron tests, 
respectively. p values are reported. The null hypothesis is the presence of unit roots. Bold fonts indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis. F: Flexibility. C: Cooperation in labor-employer relations. WF: Wage 
determination flexibility. H&F: Hiring and firing practices. R: Redundancy costs (weeks of salary). P&P: Pay 
and productivity. PM: Reliance on professional management. D is first difference and includes only intercept 
in test equation. * Includes intercept and trend in test equation. 
 
TABLE 5 
Labor Market Efficiency and FDI Flows in Middle Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: FDI Net Inflows per Capita (System GMM Estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 F C WF H&F R P&P PM 
L.FDI 0.486a 0.583a 0.583a 0.590a 0.420a 0.548a 0.593a 
 (0.093) (0.097) (0.101) (0.098) (0.088) (0.095) (0.102) 
GROWTH 12.935a 12.596a 11.400b 12.879a 14.477a 11.737b 12.317a 
 (4.491) (4.784) (4.558) (4.855) (4.662) (4.984) (4.740) 
TRADE -0.311 -0.079 -0.061 -0.045 -0.227 -0.271 -0.034 
 (0.552) (0.318) (0.300) (0.340) (0.455) (0.488) (0.313) 
FINANCE -0.470b -0.579b -0.481 -0.655b -0.933a -0.649c -0.634b 
 (0.229) (0.273) (0.328) (0.311) (0.288) (0.359) (0.306) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 1.494a 1.262a 1.257a 1.238a 0.803 1.367a 1.316a 
 (0.392) (0.360) (0.339) (0.404) (0.492) (0.386) (0.394) 
LABOR 83.855c 3.974 24.201 0.998 -1.121a 41.543 15.479 
 (45.806) (30.501) (25.459) (19.477) (0.374) (33.292) (25.841) 
INSTITUTIONS 91.419b 84.005c 83.098c 96.067c 105.157c 85.354c 76.371 
 (45.426) (44.636) (48.424) (49.627) (57.453) (51.170) (52.090) 
Constant -395.599b -52.184 -155.516 -41.344 138.440c -183.418 -116.330 
 (190.808) (138.753) (131.920) (114.603) (75.456) (135.154) (151.847) 
Obs. 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
Countries 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Instruments 37 34 34 34 31 34 34 
Wald test 95.9 175.7 149 178 93.1 134.8 166.4 
A-B (AR2) test 0.149 0.211 0.177 0.215 0.145 0.175 0.217 
Hansen test 0.304 0.220 0.233 0.267 0.170 0.184 0.210 
Notes: Robust errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. F: Flexibility. C: Cooperation 
in labor-employer relations. WF: Wage determination flexibility. H&F: Hiring and firing practices. R: Redundancy costs 
(weeks of salary). P&P: Pay and productivity. PM: Reliance on professional management. Instruments are collapsed. 
Figures for Wald, A-B (AR2) and Hansen tests are p values. 
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The influence of LMF on FDI flows is positive though statistically insignificant in most specifications. 
Overall LMF has the highest positive influence on FDI flows though marginally significant. An increase in 
overall flexibility by 1 point increases FDI flows per capita by US$84. The increase in labor redundancy costs, 
a dimension of LMF, discourages FDI inflows per capita though with a limited magnitude of slightly above 
US$1. 
Table 6 reports the estimation results for the combined middle income and GCC countries sample. The 
results for the lagged dependent variable, GROWTH and INFRATSRUCTURE are similar to those of table 5. 
The influence of INSTITUTIONS, however, becomes statistically insignificant in all but one specification. The 
coefficient of FINANCE also becomes statistically insignificant. The coefficient of TRADE becomes positive, 
as one would expect, though statistically insignificant. In addition, the influence of overall LMF becomes 
statistically insignificant. The negative influence of labor redundancy costs is robust to the inclusion of the 
GCC countries in the sample, however. 
Being a GCC country increases FDI flows per capita by more than US$4,000 in specification 1. This 
GCC regional advantage, compared to other middle income countries, does not hold in the remaining 
specifications however. In specification 1, LMF in GCC countries reduces FDI inflows by nearly US$750. The 
net effect of being a GCC country on FDI inflows per capita is about US$208 (evaluated at the period mean). 
 
7. Robustness Checks 
We undertook robustness check of the estimation methodology. Instead of using system GMM 
approach, we adopted an instrumental variables approach instrumenting for TRADE and the overall LMF 
dimension of LABOR. We also accounted for heteroskedasticity associated with the use of middle income 
countries and autocorrelation in the time series. The results for the middle income countries are reported in 
table 7. In all specifications the model is identified, and the instruments are valid and the excluded instruments 
are correctly excluded (at the 5 percent significance level). 
LABOR estimates are similar to those of table 5. Overall LMF statistical significance (at 5 percent 
statistical significance) has increased though the magnitude of the coefficient decreased. Redundancy costs  
continue to reduce FDI inflows per capita though with lower coefficient magnitude. Professional management 
21 
 
has a positive influence on FDI inflows. Unlike the results of table 5, TRADE coefficients though continue to 
be negative are now statistically significant. 
The results for the combined middle income and GCC countries are reported in table 8. In all 
specifications but one (specification 6) the model is identified, the instruments are valid and the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded (at the 5 percent significance level). Compared to table 6, the influence of 
overall LMF becomes statistically significant similar to the one for middle income countries sample of table 5, 
while the significance of the coefficients of the GCC variables (in the same specification) disappears. In 
specification 7, professional management exerts a negative influence on FDI inflows to the GCC countries. 
However, being a GCC country has a positive net influence of FDI inflows of nearly US$160 per capita 
(evaluated at the period mean). 
 
TABLE 6 
Labor Market Efficiency and FDI Flows in Middle Income and GCC Countries 
Dependent Variable: FDI Net Inflows per Capita (System GMM Estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES F C WF H&F R P&P PM 
L.FDI 0.370a 0.410a 0.441a 0.420a 0.388a 0.396a 0.434a 
 (0.056) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.067) (0.066) (0.036) 
GROWTH 11.785a 10.851b 10.642b 11.121b 12.711a 12.701a 12.371a 
 (3.847) (4.641) (4.325) (4.571) (4.651) (4.262) (4.436) 
TRADE 0.229 0.731 0.471 0.282 0.122 0.234 0.443 
 (0.765) (0.704) (0.589) (0.607) (0.352) (0.859) (0.651) 
FINANCE -0.368 -0.336 -0.147 -0.212 -0.777b -0.153 0.004 
 (0.498) (0.585) (0.676) (0.639) (0.383) (0.579) (0.660) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 1.357b 1.067c 1.105 1.195c 0.540 1.417b 1.105c 
 (0.612) (0.638) (0.694) (0.724) (0.629) (0.720) (0.671) 
LABOR 78.734 -27.486 31.206 -7.668 -1.321a 33.211 -13.194 
 (56.398) (50.777) (32.213) (28.237) (0.380) (48.181) (37.567) 
GCC 4,113.920c 2,648.334 1,978.807 -350.477 -47.221 -477.619 574.997 
 (2,233.722) (2,580.281) (1,988.348) (1,416.241) (148.434) (2,927.628) (1,277.867) 
GCC*LABOR -750.992c -487.859 -316.270 126.526 5.516b 145.770 -80.941 
 (412.696) (499.841) (341.773) (327.981) (2.276) (652.955) (263.357) 
INSTITUTIONS 90.230 85.219 90.599 100.905c 83.842 79.287 94.379 
 (64.864) (60.380) (59.302) (61.155) (54.968) (72.159) (63.410) 
Constant -384.696 63.708 -201.271 -5.009 140.971c -181.811 3.563 
 (254.503) (195.064) (192.382) (158.008) (84.878) (181.928) (187.796) 
        
Obs. 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
Countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Instruments 40 36 36 36 33 41 36 
Wald test 436.6 964.0 1178.8 1700.0 287.9 784.3 802.9 
A-B (AR2) test 0.153 0.202 0.323 0.655 0.242 0.444 0.233 
Hansen test 0.302 0.144 0.195 0.19 0.31 0.202 0.117 
Notes: Robust errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. F: Flexibility. C: Cooperation 
in labor-employer relations. WF: Wage determination flexibility. H&F: Hiring and firing practices. R: Redundancy costs 
(weeks of salary). P&P: Pay and productivity. PM: Reliance on professional management. Instruments are collapsed. 
Figures for Wald, A-B (AR2) and Hansen tests are p values. 
 
 
 
TABLE 7 
Labor Market Efficiency and FDI Flows in Middle Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: FDI Net Inflows per Capita (IV Estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 F C WF H&F R P&P PM 
L.FDI 0.761a 0.803a 0.814a 0.804a 0.737a 0.803a 0.812a 
 (0.073) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.076) 
GROWTH 13.342a 11.205a 11.428a 11.147a 15.430a 11.098a 11.871a 
 (3.532) (3.210) (3.189) (3.232) (3.316) (3.222) (3.269) 
TRADE -0.904a -0.746b -0.652b -0.697b -0.643b -0.708b -0.754a 
 (0.296) (0.304) (0.290) (0.275) (0.266) (0.294) (0.269) 
FINANCE -0.290 -0.202 -0.224 -0.232 -0.463b -0.180 -0.383c 
 (0.201) (0.198) (0.189) (0.191) (0.208) (0.230) (0.213) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 1.472a 1.413a 1.335a 1.358a 1.063a 1.396a 1.581a 
 (0.294) (0.306) (0.283) (0.279) (0.294) (0.282) (0.300) 
LABOR 53.304b 5.978 -16.742 -10.932 -0.576a -5.877 35.963c 
 (23.863) (20.108) (13.040) (12.453) (0.222) (15.622) (19.210) 
INSTITUTIONS 53.770b 57.029b 55.520b 56.451b 54.773b 60.896b 38.732 
 (25.214) (25.539) (27.058) (26.486) (25.201) (25.766) (27.978) 
Constant -289.395a -89.133 16.782 -19.374 2.958 -39.784 -241.032b 
 (103.553) (92.345) (63.720) (56.668) (44.696) (56.642) (100.787) 
        
Obs. 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 
R-squared 0.781 0.775 0.777 0.774 0.790 0.774 0.776 
LR statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J Statistic 0.187 0.070 0.081 0.074 0.112 0.072 0.074 
Notes: Robust errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. F: Flexibility. C: 
Cooperation in labor-employer relations. WF: Wage determination flexibility. H&F: Hiring and firing practices. R: 
Redundancy costs (weeks of salary). P&P: Pay and productivity. PM: Reliance on professional management. 
Instruments are collapsed. The LR statistic is for the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test of 
whether the equation is identified, i.e., that the excluded instruments are relevant. The statistic provides a measure 
of instrument relevance, and rejection of the null indicates that the model is identified. The Hansen test is a test of 
overidentifying restrictions. H0 is instruments are valid instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation.  Figures for the LR and Hansen J statistic are p values. 
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TABLE 8 
Labor Market Efficiency and FDI Flows in Middle Income and GCC Countries 
Dependent Variable: FDI Net Inflows per Capita (IV Estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 F C WF H&F R P&P PM 
L.FDI 0.610a 0.663a 0.649a 0.691a 0.558a 0.798a 0.685a 
 (0.098) (0.102) (0.098) (0.101) (0.095) (0.126) (0.099) 
GROWTH 12.432a 12.543a 11.925a 12.916a 12.652a 11.833a 11.981a 
 (3.103) (2.833) (2.799) (2.894) (3.170) (3.839) (2.924) 
TRADE -0.633 -0.376 -0.326 -0.367 -0.245 -0.089 -0.383 
 (0.465) (0.427) (0.429) (0.419) (0.408) (0.584) (0.418) 
FINANCE -0.330 -0.180 -0.114 -0.171 -0.608c 0.003 -0.320 
 (0.311) (0.296) (0.275) (0.305) (0.332) (0.318) (0.291) 
INFRASTRUCTURE 1.518a 1.350b 1.348a 1.413a 1.016b 1.329b 1.628a 
 (0.491) (0.539) (0.488) (0.495) (0.471) (0.631) (0.466) 
LABOR 78.268b -1.842 -7.277 -10.879 -0.867a 63.745b 29.342 
 (32.671) (25.793) (24.137) (18.020) (0.259) (32.320) (19.999) 
GCC 779.686 1,079.726 1,367.629 1,173.476 -74.967 10,404.32b 2,038.44b 
 (1,763.0) (1,908.4) (2,450.7) (1,016.6) (119.3) (4,072.01) (927.56) 
GCC*LABOR -167.024 -221.576 -249.083 -280.840 1.674 -2,341.38b -451.828b 
 (335.175) (385.987) (432.494) (240.067) (1.672) (930.127) (210.402) 
INSTITUTIONS 82.096b 86.680b 88.211b 73.283c 82.353b 3.277 62.719c 
 (36.519) (39.255) (39.480) (41.635) (38.815) (42.138) (37.800) 
Constant -378.213a -47.237 -17.690 -29.766 56.303 -382.049a -212.704b 
 (136.492) (121.686) (117.563) (82.995) (54.130) (147.887) (107.448) 
        
Obs. 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
R-squared 0.526 0.496 0.524 0.484 0.553 0.112 0.559 
LR statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.116 0.000 
Hansen J Statistic 0.264 0.100 0.073 0.152 0.305 0.756 0.077 
Notes: Robust errors in parentheses. a, b, c significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. F: Flexibility. C: Cooperation 
in labor-employer relations. WF: Wage determination flexibility. H&F: Hiring and firing practices. R: Redundancy costs 
(weeks of salary). P&P: Pay and productivity. PM: Reliance on professional management. Instruments are collapsed. The 
LR statistic is for the Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test of whether the equation is identified, i.e., that 
the excluded instruments are relevant. The statistic provides a measure of instrument relevance, and rejection of the null 
indicates that the model is identified. The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. H0 is instruments are valid 
instruments and the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.  Figures for the LR and 
Hansen J statistic are p values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has been motivated by the policy controversy over the liberalization of labor market 
institutions in GCC countries and its potential conflict with labor nationalization policies. This controversy is 
supported by the casual observation of a peculiar negative relationship between flexible LMI and FDI inflows 
to GCC countries, unlike the same positive relationship for other regions. 
The paper undertakes an empirical examination of the influence of LMF on FDI in GCC countries and 
comparator sample of middle income countries using 2006-2011 panel data. The paper robustly finds in the 
comparator middle income countries that overall LMF increases FDI flows per capita economically 
significantly while redundancy costs decrease it insignificantly. In contrast in GCC countries, overall LMF 
(under system GMM estimation methodology) and professional management (under IV estimation 
methodology) reduce FDI inflows per capita supporting the casually observed negative relationship. The 
negative influence of LMI is outweighed by positive “GCC region” influence, resulting in a net positive GCC 
influence.  
Given the current controversy regarding labor nationalization policies in GCC countries, the main 
implication of our results is that a shift towards labor force nationalization and the likely reduction in LMF is 
not necessarily a deterrent to FDI flows.  Our results lend support to other perhaps more important 
determinants of FDI flows, such as market potential and infrastructure development consistent with Mina 
(2007). The positive influence of these determinants more than overcomes the negative influence of the 
increase in non-wage costs associated with less flexible labor market institutions. In this respect, our 
interpretation is similar to that of Mogab et al. (2013) who suggest that foreign investors are more driven by 
gaining market access as opposed to minimizing total labor cost.  
As our result seems to suggest that more rigidity of labor market institutions would attract FDI 
in GCC countries, further investigation of the effect of government intervention is needed. In that respect, 
analyzing the behavior of foreign investors from a political economy standpoint, where the latter compare the 
benefits of regulation in terms of increased productivity and human capital development as suggested by 
Parcon (2008) and their associated wage and non-wage cost, would be promising. Similarly, the other counter-
25 
 
intuitive result suggesting that more professional management distracts FDI calls for investigating the political 
economy factors affecting FDI flows. 
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